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ABSTRACT 
Despite immigration law’s notorious complexity, public debate on immigration 
reform has historically ignored basic questions of why and how the current laws 
should be simplified. Instead, discussion has often focused on substantive 
proposals—most commonly regarding legalization and border enforcement—without 
reference to the impact of these proposals on the legal immigration structure. This 
article emphasizes that any durable immigration reform must take steps to free the 
immigration system from the intricacies that define it today. The article begins by 
overviewing the basic features of the modern global economy, their implications for 
immigration law, and why these implications compel an immigration system based 
on simple rules. Then, borrowing from the literature on business strategy and 
organizational design, the article applies to the current immigration system a basic 
three-step framework for developing simple rules. In the first step—Setting the 
Objective—the article argues that family reunification, the primary objective of the 
current system, does not adequately acknowledge the global economy in which the 
American immigration system operates. As economic conditions affecting the United 
States have evolved since fifty years ago when family reunification emerged as the 
cornerstone of American immigration policy, the focus of the American immigration 
system must be reoriented towards competing in the global economy. In the second 
step—Identifying a Bottleneck—the article hones in on the second and third 
categories of the current five-category preference system for admitting employment-
based immigrants. Examining the unique obstacles and complexities facing 
immigration under the EB-2 and EB-3 categories, the article identifies these 
categories as a focal point on which any effort to simplify American immigration law 
should take aim at the outset. Finally, in the third step—Formulating the Rules—the 
article argues that from the perspective of simplicity, a provisional visa program 
proposed by many commentators offers a legal system that is user-created, 
repetitively applicable, and easily adaptable—features that are necessary for the 
effective practical application of simple rules. As such, provisional visas provide a 
structurally viable replacement for the procedures currently used to admit 
immigrants who fall under the EB-2 and EB-3 categories. The overarching purpose 
of this article is to emphasize that sustainable reform of American immigration law 
must not only make substantive revisions, but also initiate a process of structural 
simplification. The article offers a conceptual starting point for this process by 
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applying to the current immigration system a basic business-strategy framework for 
developing simple rules. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
mmigration is reputed as one of the most complex areas of 
American law. It has been described by courts as “certain to 
accelerate the aging process of judges”;
1
 “mollusks of jargon” from 
which “morsels of comprehension must be pried”;
2
 and a “never-never 
land . . . where plain words do not always mean what they say.”
3
 The 
Ombudsman for the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services reported in 2007 that “[o]ne of the most serious problems 
facing individuals and employers is the complexity of the immigration 
process”—the “opaque nature of the immigration rules and the agency 
administering them.”
4
 Yet, public debate on immigration reform has 
historically ignored basic questions of why and how the current laws 
should be simplified. Instead, discussion has often focused on 
substantive proposals—most commonly regarding legalization and 
border enforcement—without reference to the impact of these 
proposals on the legal immigration structure. The need to simplify this 
structure serves as the focus of this paper. 
Part II provides an overview of the basic features of the modern 
global economy, their implications for immigration law, and why these 
implications compel an immigration system based on simple rules. 
Parts III and IV then borrow a basic three-step framework for 
developing simple rules from the literature on business strategy and 
organizational design, and applies this framework to the current 
immigration system. Part III.A—Setting the Objective—argues that 
family reunification, the primary focus of the current system, does not 
adequately address the economic conditions that the country faces 
today. As these conditions were absent fifty years ago when family 
reunification emerged as the cornerstone of American immigration 
policy, the focus of the system must be reoriented towards adapting to 
the global economy. Next, Part III.B—Identifying a Bottleneck—
hones in on the second and third categories of the current five-category 
preference system for admitting employment-based immigrants. 
                                                 
1
 Michele Kim, The Complexity of Immigration Law, IMMIGR. L. ON THE WEB, 
http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,1215-kim.shtm (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) 
(quoting Tim Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
2
 Id. (quoting Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
3
 Id. (quoting Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney General, 479 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
4
 USCIS OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 7 (2007). 
I 
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Examining the unique obstacles and complexities facing immigration 
under these two categories, Part III.B identifies EB-2 and EB-3 
immigration as a critical area on which any effort to simplify 
American immigration law should focus at the outset. Finally, Part 
IV—Formulating Simple Rules—surveys the two main types of 
systems that today’s advanced economies use to regulate economic 
immigration—point-based and employer-driven. Part IV argues that 
proposals to consolidate the best components of each of these two 
systems into a “provisional visa” program, as proposed by many 
commentators, offer a set of rules that are user-created, repetitively 
applicable, and easily adaptable—features that are necessary for the 
effective practical application of simple rules. As such, provisional 
visas provide a structurally viable replacement for the procedures 
currently used to admit the types of immigrants covered by the EB-2 
and EB-3 categories. The overarching purpose of this paper is to 
emphasize that any durable immigration reform must take steps to free 
the immigration structure from the intricacies that define it today. As a 
conceptual starting point for this process, this paper applies to the 
current immigration system a basic business-strategy framework for 
developing simple rules. 
II. IMMIGRATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
A. Globalization and the Need to Simplify 
“Globalization” is defined in many ways.
5
 But it can be generally 
described as the rapid erosion of barriers to exchange which thereby 
expands and accelerates the international flow of various tangible and 
intangible things.
6
 In the face of profound innovations in transportation 
and communication, globalization is the product of a push-pull 
dynamic—nations are not only affirmatively lowering their barriers, 
but also losing their ability to sustain them.
7
 Globalization has 
expanded transnational activity, and continues, with growing intricacy, 
to interweave the political, social, and economic landscapes of 
countries around the world. The process is fast, fluid, big and complex, 
                                                 
5
 See David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1278 n.2 (2008). 
6
 Id. at 1278. 
7
 Id. at 1286. 
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and points to “a future that we have created yet cannot fully control.”
8
 
However, to thrive within this future, individuals and institutions must 
adapt to it. 
For the United States, one pivotal policy area requiring adaptation 
is immigration. Globalization has opened up a world market of human 
capital while also increasing international human mobility.
9
 This has 
intensified global competition for foreign workers with valuable skills, 
and expanded the options these workers have, regarding prospective 
countries to immigrate to.
10
 Therefore, to remain viable in a global 
economy, nations, including the United States, must adopt friendly 
immigration policies. The burden of complying with tortuous 
immigration laws constricts the legal inflow of demanded low-skill 
migrant labor, while also impelling domestic employers to outsource 
high-skill jobs.
11
 As such, globalization does not merely call for 
reform to the American immigration system, but a major simplification 
of it. 
B. Immigration as Business Strategy 
Studies on business strategy and organizational design reveal that 
decisions predicated on simple rules are critical in ever-evolving, high-
velocity environments like the global economy.
12
 Because 
opportunities are fleeting and unpredictable in such environments, 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 1279. 
9
 Paschal O. Nwokocha, American Employment-Based Immigration Program in a 
Competitive Global Marketplace: Need for Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
38, 60 (2008). 
10
 See id. at 60-61. 
11
 See Vignaswari Saminathan, An Analysis of the U.S. Employment Immigration 
System in Attracting and Retaining Skilled Workers and the Effects of its 
Dichotomous Objectives—Competitiveness versus Protectionism: A Case for 
Reform?, 32 PACE L. REV. 149, 171-72 (2012). 
12
 See, e.g., Jason P. Davis, Kathleen M. Eisenhardt & Christopher B. Bingham, 
Optimal Structure, Market Dynamism, and the Strategy of Simple Rules, 54 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 413 (2009); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt & Donald N. Sull, Strategy 
as Simple Rules, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2001, at 107 [hereinafter Eisenhardt & 
Sull, Strategy as Simple Rules]; Kathleen M. Eisenhardt & Donald N. Sull, 
Simple Rules for a Complex World, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2012, at 69 
[hereinafter Eisenhardt & Sull, Simple Rules for a Complex World].The 
principle that complexity is best managed by applying simple rules also finds 
support in areas of study outside of immigration law. See, e.g., RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); JOHN MAEDA, THE 
LAWS OF SIMPLICITY: DESIGN, TECHNOLOGY, BUSINESS, LIFE (2006). 
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organizations are best able to seize them through actions based on a 
small menu of simple and concrete rules.
13
 Dynamic environments are 
not conducive to a large and intricate legal system because such a 
system bogs down the decision-making process in a setting in which 
opportunities must be seized quickly.
14
 At the same time, dynamic 
environments are also not conducive to pure improvisation because a 
lack of structured guidance leads to confusion about which fleeting 
opportunities to pursue.
15
 Rather, where decisions must be made in a 
climate of rapid and continuous change, a strategy based on simple 
rules provides the best tradeoff between structure and flexibility.
16
 
Application of this principle to American immigration law has the 
potential to revitalize a presently impotent system. 
C. Simplifying by Liberalizing 
How might the process of simplification be applied to reform 
American immigration law? In theory, one way might be to adopt a 
policy of open borders under which people would be allowed to 
migrate into the country barring only the most exceptional 
circumstances, such as when the prospective migrant is a terrorist.
17
 
Another possible way is to adopt an isolationist policy by prohibiting 
all immigration subject to exceptions when the government, by its 
discretion, sees fit.
18
 While simplifying the immigration system does 
not require reaching either of these extremes, standard economic 
assumptions and observations point generally towards more open 
borders.
19
 For example, the liberalization of the trade of goods after 
                                                 
13
 Eisenhardt & Sull, Strategy for Simple Rules, supra note12, at 108. 
14




 Id. See also Davis et al., supra note 12, at 413-18. 
17
 See Terrorism and Illegal Immigration in the U.S., OPEN BORDERS, 
http://openborders.info/terrorism-and-illegal-immigration-in-the-united-states/ 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
18
 For example, North Korea imposes strict entry and exit migration controls. 
Migration into North Korea mostly involves temporary visits as a result of the 
country’s diplomatic assent to certain integration efforts by South Korea. See 
Hiroyuki Tanaka, North Korea: Understanding Migration to and From a Closed 
Country, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.migrationpolicy
.org/article/north-korea-understanding-migration-and-closed-country. 
19
 Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare 
and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1148-52 (1997). 
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the Second World War, facilitated by a substantial reduction in tariffs 
and other trade barriers, induced a dramatic rise in global economic 
output.
20
 Analogously, prospects for a similar result are compelled by 
liberalizing the movement of labor.
21
 Because the complexity of 
American immigration law is a legal barrier to the free movement of 
foreign workers into the United States, the system effectively limits 
American access to a burgeoning global marketplace of talent and 
skill. This limitation hurts economic prosperity given the relatively 
large American demand for high-skill workers and the relatively short 
American supply of low-skill workers.
22
 As such, simplifying 
immigration law has the potential to increase economic well-being 
both domestically and globally.
23
 Simplification can help rejuvenate 
the American immigration system by liberalizing it to conform to a 
global economy. 
III. SETTING THE OBJECTIVE AND IDENTIFYING A BOTTLENECK 
A contemporary immigration system must be based on simple 
rules, but developing such rules is not necessarily a simple task. This is 
because simplifying immigration law within a dynamic environment 
entails more than merely unraveling the complexity of the rules 
currently on the books. For example, the laws must also be concrete, 
consistent, and guide a few key processes rather than trying to provide 
                                                 
20
 See, e.g., The Case for Open Trade, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org
/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
21
 See Chang, supra note 19, at 1148-52. 
22
 See GORDON H. HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ECONOMIC 
LOGIC OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 14 (2007).See also Howard F. Chang, 
Immigration and the Workplace: Immigration Restrictions as Employment 
Discrimination, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 297 (2003) (“Immigration 
restrictions distort the global labor market, producing a misallocation of labor 
among countries, thereby wasting human resources and creating unnecessary 
poverty in labor-abundant countries.”). 
23
 A recent survey of the literature on labor mobility found that open borders 
would increase world gross domestic product by 50-150%.Double World GDP, 
OPEN BORDERS, http://openborders.info/double-world-gdp/(last visited Mar. 14, 
2014) (citing Michael Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar 
Bills on the Sidewalk, 25 J. ECON. PERSP.83 (2011)).The same survey found that 
even a partial relaxation of migration barriers would produce substantial global 
gains. Id. 
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guidance wholesale.
24
 Moreover, they must be amenable to rigorous 
conformity by the user once adopted, but also be capable of evolution 
when on the verge of becoming outmoded.
25
 Most fundamentally, they 
must promote the ultimate objective for which they were adopted.
26
 To 
facilitate the creation of workable simple rules, the literature on 
business strategy and organizational design offers a basic three-step 
framework that can be used to begin thinking about how to simplify 
the current immigration system.
27
 
A. Setting the Objective: Global Economic Compatibility 
The first step in the framework is to set the objective. Since the 
enactment of the 1965 Hart-Cellar amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), the primary objective of American immigration 
law has been family reunification.
28
 Hart-Cellar placed the national-
origins quotas
29
 with a system under which immigrants—that is, 
migrants seeking permanent stay
30
—are admitted primarily based on 
                                                 
24
 See Eisenhardt & Sull, Strategy as Simple Rules, supra note 12, at 108-09, 112-
13; Eisenhardt & Sull, Simple Rules for a Complex World, supra note 12, at 69, 
71-74. 
25
 Eisenhardt & Sull, Strategy as Simple Rules, supra note 12,at 115; Eisenhardt & 
Sull, Simples Rules for a Complex World, supra note 12, at 74. 
26
 See Eisenhardt & Sull, Strategy as Simple Rules, supra note 12, at 109; 
Eisenhardt & Sull, Simple Rules for a Complex World, supra note 12, at 71. 
27
 See Eisenhardt & Sull, Simple Rules for a Complex World, supra note 12, at 71-
74 (laying out “rules for developing simple rules”). 
28
 See Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790-Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 
2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/timeline-1790; WILLIAM A. 
KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRATION POLICY 
10 (2013). 
29
 The national-origins quota system introduced numerical limitations to U.S. 
immigration law. See Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790-Present, supra note 
28. Established by the 1924 National Origins Quota Act, and presaged by the 
Emergency Quota Act of 1921, the system imposed on every nationality of the 
Eastern Hemisphere an immigration limit equaling a percentage of the 
nationality’s proportion of the United States foreign-born population. Id. 
30
 The Immigration and Nationality Act effectively defines “immigrant” as an alien 
who is authorized to take up permanent residence in the United States. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15) 
(2012); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 272 (7th ed. 2011). Accordingly, this paper 
uses the term “immigrant” (as distinguished from the more general term, 
“immigration”) to refer to a migrant who intends or is authorized to stay in the 
United States permanently. 
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their family relationship to an American citizen or lawful permanent 
resident.
31
 While the INA, as originally enacted in 1952, had already 
established a hierarchy of family-based preferences,
32
 and the principle 
of family reunification had been introduced to the law even earlier,
33
 
the Hart-Cellar amendments were the last major step in formulating 
the family-based preference system that dominates immigrant 
admissions today.
34
 While the INA—both as originally passed, and as 
amended in 1965—also provided for employment-based immigration, 
it placed the highest priority on admissions based on family 
relationships.
35
 As such, family reunification emerged as the 
cornerstone of American immigration policy,
36
 and has remained so, 
notwithstanding subsequent efforts to strengthen the employment-
based component of the immigration system.
37
 Over the course of the 
last decade, family-based immigrants have made up roughly two-thirds 
of annual immigrant admissions.
38
 
Drastic economic changes since 1965 call for a reassessment of the 
basic purpose of American immigration law. Hart-Cellar was enacted 
during a decade of growing prosperity and economic expansion which 
the nation does not presently enjoy.
39
 The 1960s marked a period of 
“unprecedented growth in productivity, shrinking unemployment, and 
rapidly expanding real GDP per capita,
40
“ also during which time 
                                                 
31
 See Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790-Present, supra note 28. 
32




 See id.; Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790-Present, supra note 28. 
35
 See JOYCE VIALET, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 25 (1980). 
36
 Id. at 3, 25. 
37
 Most notable and comprehensive among these efforts was the Immigration Act 
of 1990 which almost tripled the number of employment-based visas available 
from 54,000 to 140,000 per year and divided them among five preference 
categories. See Warren R. Leiden & David L. Neal, Highlights of the U.S. 
Immigration Act of 1990, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 328 (1990); William V. 
Roebuck, Jr., The Move to Employment-Based Immigration in the Immigration 
Act of 1990: Towards a New Definition of ‘Immigrant’, 16 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 523 (1991). 
38
 KANDEL, supra note 28, at 5. 
39
 See Roebuck, supra note 37, at 533-34. 
40
 Id. 
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“Americans believed all these trends would continue indefinitely.”
41
 
The global market was not as heavily integrated in 1965 as it is today, 
and developments in areas such as education and technology over the 
last fifty years have resulted in unprecedented levels of American 
demand for foreign labor.
42
 Indeed, even the labor movement, 
historically among the staunchest opponents of increased immigration, 
reversed its stance in recent years in major part because the forces of 
globalization had transformed labor demographics.
43
 
Despite these economic trends, the current family-based 
immigration system has been largely unresponsive. Studies show that 
the rate of legal immigration has shown little to no sensitivity to the 
unemployment rate over the last fifty years.
44
 Moreover, since the end 
of the Bracero program in 1964,
45
 unauthorized immigration has 
swelled by responding to market forces in ways that immigration law 
has not.
46
 Accordingly, commentators have often questioned, or 
ignored altogether, the very concept of legality under the current 
system because there is little reason to believe that the law in its 
present state is capable of distinguishing between beneficial and 
harmful immigration.
47
 Therefore, if the system is to be meaningfully 




 See, e.g.,HANSON, supra note 22, at 14-15 (explaining that increases in U.S. 
high school completion rates have prompted a shortage of native workers 
willing to take on important low-skill jobs); RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WITH SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS (STEM) DEGREES24 (2013) 
(noting the broad consensus among leaders of high-skill industries that U.S. 
retention of foreign STEM graduates is critical to American competitiveness in 
the global economy). 
43
 See Don Gonyea, How the Labor Movement did a 180 on Immigration, NPR 
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/05/171175054/how-the-labor-
movement-did-a-180-on-immigration; Michael Kazin, How Labor Learned to 




 HANSON, supra note 22, at 16-18. 
45
 The Bracero program was a series of agreements between the United States and 
Mexico beginning in 1942 that allowed Mexican laborers to come to the United 
States on a temporary basis to work primarily in agriculture. See id. at 9. 
46
 Id. at 14-18. 
47
 See, e.g., id.at 5 (concluding that there is little evidence to suggest that legal 
immigration is economically preferable to illegal immigration); Hiroshi 
Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2083 
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reformed, it must become sensitive to the dynamic trends of the global 
economy. 
This does not mean, however, that economic interest must be 
American immigration law’s only policy. Hart-Cellar’s shift away 
from the quota system, which was widely regarded as racist,
48
 
reflected the country’s evolving political and cultural sentiments 
during the 1960s.
49
 The concurrent move towards a policy of family 
reunification
50
 also coincided with humanitarian concerns that in major 
part informed the expansion of refugee admissions during roughly the 
same period.
51
 In simplifying the current laws, these attitudes and 
concerns neither need, nor should, be abandoned. Family is a basic 
human value, and family units provide material and moral support to 
help immigrants assimilate, achieve success, and contribute to 
society.
52
 Moreover, dire circumstances may also arise that implicate 
humanitarian and foreign-relations concerns warranting 
accommodation by American immigration policy. It would therefore 
be a mistake to treat immigration as nothing more than a cross-country 
staffing agency—as a mere mechanism for connecting domestic 
employers to a foreign labor supply.
53
 However, commitment to the 
                                                                                                                   
(2008) (arguing that unlawful presence is a status that is “merely transitory and 
relatively inconsequential”); Elina Treyger, The Deportation Conundrum, 44 
SETON HALL L. REV. 109, 116 (2014) (asserting that the static nature of 
numerical admission limits suggests little reason to think that the distinction 
between legal and illegal migration tracks the distinction between good and bad 
migration, and further noting that most empirical studies on the impact of 
immigration on receiving countries do not distinguish between legal and illegal 
immigration). 
48
 See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of 
Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 854 (2007). 
49
 See VIALET, supra note 35, at 24. 
50
 To be sure, there is some evidence that Congressional support for the family-
based system was motivated in part by an expectation that the system, like the 
national-origins quotas, would preserve racial homogeneity in the United States. 
See Cox & Posner, supra note 48, at 854.Nevertheless, a prevailing concern for 
keeping families intact was the emphasis of Congress’ enactment of the INA and 
its policy of family reunification. See id. at 853. 
51
 See id. at 19, 22-24. 
52
 KANDEL, supra note 28, at 25-26. 
53
 See Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 857, 869-70 (2007) (pointing out how European immigration policy in the 
1960s and 1970s, which treated the recruitment of foreign workers as simply 
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fundamental ideas underlying the family-based system must also not 
obscure the global economic challenges confronting the nation 
today—challenges which were absent fifty years ago. Simplification 
does not demand singularity but it does require focus. In the case of 
American immigration law, focus must be reoriented towards building 
a legal system that is more responsive to economic forces. 
B. Identifying a Bottleneck: EB-2 and EB-3 
Having determined the objective, the next step in developing 
simple rules is to identify a bottleneck—an area in which opportunities 
consistent with the objective exceed the resources available to seize 
them.
54
 To accommodate rules that are specific and concrete, it is 
important for simplification efforts to concentrate on a particular area 
where opportunities most exceed the resources available—where 
simple rules will likely have the greatest impact.
55
 Within the current 
immigration system, that area is comprised of two of the five 






As seen in the table below, these two categories account for 
seventy percent of all employment-based immigrant admissions, and 
are comprised of professionals with “advanced degrees,” aliens of 
“exceptional ability,” professionals with bachelor’s degrees or other 
                                                                                                                   
employers picking employees, resulted in incomplete integration of immigrant 
communities). 
54




 See Anton F. Mertens, Build a Better Mousetrap and the World will Beat a Path 
to your Door: Can the Employment-Based Immigration Process be Improved?, 
5 J. MARSHALL L. J. 513, 530-36 (2012). 
57
 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. EB-2 and EB-3 immigrants are 
comprised of professionals with “advanced degrees,” aliens of “exceptional 
ability,” professionals with bachelor’s degrees, and low-skill workers. See INA 
§ 203(b)(2)-(3), 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(2)-(3) (2012).Put differently, the only 
foreign workers for which labor certification is not required are those who are 
somehow especially unusual—those of “extraordinary ability,” certain “special” 
immigrants, immigrant investors, and select EB-2 immigrants for whom waiving 
certification requirements serves the “national interest.” See INA § 203(b)(1), 
(2)(B), (4)-(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1), (2)(B), (4)-(5).As such, labor certification 
constricts the core economic channels through which the vast majority of 
foreign workers seek permanent admission into to the U.S. 
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skilled workers, and low-skill workers.
58
 Put differently, the vast 
majority of employment-based immigrants who are not covered by 
these categories are somehow especially unusual—”priority 
workers”
59





 immigrant investors, and select EB-2s for 
whom waiving certification requirements serves the “national 
interest.”
62
 Indeed, admission under many of these latter categories 
does not even require sponsorship by an employer.
63
 As such, the 
complexities affecting the EB-2 and EB-3 categories constrict the 
primary channels through which employment-based immigrants are 
admitted into the United States.
64
 Simplifying these complexities can 
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EB-2 and EB-3 Admissions, FYs 2006–2012* 
 
*Sources: ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 30, at 285 (for FYs 2006-2010); Office 
of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Annual Flow Report, U.S. 
Legal Permanent Residents: 2012, Table 2, at 3 (2013) (for FYs 2011-2012). 
 
1. Labor Certification 
A problem uniquely affecting immigration under the EB-2 and EB-
3 categories is the labor certification process. The basic purpose of 
labor certification is twofold: to ensure that foreign workers do not 
“take jobs away” from competing American workers, and to ensure 
that foreign workers do not drive down United States working 
conditions and wages.
65
 Conventionally, labor certification requires 
employers to place a job order with, and receive a prevailing wage 
determination from a state workforce agency in the area where the job 
is located.
66
 They are then required to go through a recruitment phase 
in which they advertise the job to American workers pursuant to an 
elaborate regulatory framework.
67
 Employers are also required to keep 
                                                 
65
 INA §212(a)(5)(A)(i). 
66








































.703 .799 .722 .61 .632 .747 .626 .694 
2014 Immigration as Business Strategy 179 




Labor certification is problematic for at least three basic reasons. 
First, the process is a labyrinth. Regulations set forth along set of 
recruitment procedures, the intricacy of which can be sampled by just 
glancing at some introductory requirements such as “placing an 
advertisement on two different Sundays in the newspaper of general 
circulation in the area of intended employment”
69
 and selecting three 
additional recruitment steps from a statutory list, “only one of [which] 
may consist solely of activity that took place within 30 days of the 
filing of the application [and] [n]one of [which] may have taken place 
more than 180 days prior to filing the application.”
70
 Specific 
requirements for preparing the recruitment report are also complicated, 
demanding that employers “describ[e] the recruitment steps 
undertaken and the results achieved, the number of hires, and, if 
applicable, the number of American workers rejected, categorized by 
the lawful job related reasons for such rejections.”
71
 Employers must 
additionally take care, pursuant to a detailed list of constraints, that the 
job description is not unduly restrictive,
72
 a task which can often be 
quite precarious.
73
 Because of such complexities, several months, and 
sometimes years, are required for these pre-filing procedures alone, 
followed by additional months or years waiting for a backlogged 
Department of Labor to review the application.
74
 The toil of the 
certification process imposes heavy costs on American employers and 
foreign workers seeking mutual gains, and by consequence, burdens 
the economy as a whole. 
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Second, labor certification grounds permanent employment-based 
admission determinations solely in the labor market’s immediate, 
short-term needs.
75
 By conditioning the decision of whether to admit a 
permanent addition to the labor force on nothing more than the basis of 
a particular job opening, labor certification ignores additional 
considerations, such as whether the prospective immigrant is likely to 
integrate, succeed, and contribute to society in the long run.
76
 Instead, 
the process readily offers permanent admission to an applicant to 
perform a specific function without assessment of whether that 
function will generate any long-term benefit.
77
 The result is a 
miscalibrated system that uses a set of criteria to make decisions with 
significant implications which those criteria fail to take into account.
78
 
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, labor certification 
institutionalizes misguided protectionist notions by requiring 
employers to search for a qualified American worker, ultimately to no 
avail, before tapping into the foreign labor market.
79
 In effect, the 
process presumes that the national economy does not need more 
foreign workers.
80
 This, however, is a fallacious presumption. Among 
foreign workers for whom labor certification is granted, virtually all of 
them are already in the United States at the time the application is 
filed, with the vast majority working for the filing employer either 
without authorization or under a temporary visa.
81
 In other words, 
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most workers seeking admission under the EB-2 and EB-3 categories 
are not overseas as the design of labor certification presumes, but are 
already here working, and merely seeking adjustment to permanent 
status. Moreover, family-based immigrants, who comprise roughly 
two-thirds of all permanent admissions each year,
82
 are also likely to 
work and compete with natives for jobs, yet are not subject to any pre-
admission labor certification requirements.
83
 These observations 
indicate a sharp dichotomy between labor certification and economic 
reality. 
2. Statutory Ceilings 
Labor certification is not the only complex governmental 
constraint inhibiting EB-2 and EB-3 immigration. Congressionally 
mandated immigration ceilings also contribute to the bottleneck by 
limiting the number of admissions under each of these categories to 
40,000 per year,
84
 with low-skill workers further limited by a paltry 
annual cap of 5,000.
85
 The inadequacy of these numbers is indicated 
by the significantly higher number of actual EB-2 and EB-3 
admissions each year due to the law’s “spill-down” provisions
86
 (see 
table above), and the 300,000—chiefly low-skill—unauthorized 
immigrants entering the American labor force each year.
87
 
Category ceilings are additionally subject to per-country caps that 
limit annual immigrant admissions to roughly 25,600 per sending 
country.
88
 The purpose of these per-country caps is to provide for a 
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level of diversity among admitted immigrants by ensuring that no 
single country receives a number of annual admissions exceeding the 
per-country limit.
89
 However, these caps, and the highly complex 
formulas that go into precisely calculating them each year, have 
resulted in prolonged delays.
90
 For example, EB-2 and EB-3 applicants 
from India may have to wait as much as ten to eleven years to obtain a 
permanent visa,
91
 while applicants from other countries can also have 
wait times amounting to several years.
92
 The upshot of these 
shortcomings is a legal economic immigration system that fails to 
reflect economic needs. Therefore, it is no surprise that employers in 
high-skill industries have turned to “temporary” work visas as their 
primary method for retaining foreign workers, while low-skill workers 
have made use of illegal entry as their main migratory channel.
93
 
Accordingly, EB-2 and EB-3 admissions, along with periodic 
legalizations, have largely become devices that merely formalize what 
has already occurred in the market long ago.
94
 
Moreover, the rigidity of statutory ceilings has prevented the 
permanent employment-based immigration system from responding to 
changes in supply and demand, and from avoiding or mitigating the 
aforementioned delays.
95
 Grounded in the same protectionist rationale 
as labor certification, statutory ceilings have long been a politically 
dicey issue and have therefore been difficult to change.
96
 As one 
commentator put it, “[i]t would be nothing short of a miracle if 
statutory limits . . . were to correspond to the levels and kind of 
immigration that would best advance the aims that justify 
immigration.”
97
 Because numerical caps are set by statutes that are 
reassessed, on average, less than once per decade,
98
 the caps’ 
shortcomings have unfortunately become an unremarkable fact of life 
within the current system. 
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In sum, the deficiencies of labor certification and statutory 
numerical limits introduce numerous complexities, encumbrances, and 
pretenses to the vast majority of prospective employment-based 
immigrants and their employers. The bottleneck this creates in the 
American immigration system, especially in the EB-2 and EB-3 
categories, is a critical reason why the system is economically unfit. 
To render the system more responsive to the global labor market, the 
primary legal channels through which the country admits employment-
based immigrants must be based on simplified rules. As such, 
American immigration policy must move towards both eliminating 
labor certification and significantly increasing statutory caps if the 
current system is to be meaningfully reformed. 
IV. FORMULATING THE RULES 
Having set the objective and identified a bottleneck, the final step 
of the business-strategy framework for simplifying the immigration 
system is formulating the rules. If the law is to be capable of 
effectively governing immigration, discarding both labor certification 
requirements and increasing numerical caps in determining which, and 
how many, prospective employment-based immigrants should be 
admitted, do not alone give rise to the simple rules necessary to guide 
this determination. Functional, simple rules, are created not by simply 
undoing complexity, but by formulating a set of requirements that are 
user-friendly, rigorously applicable, and adaptable to changing 
conditions.
99
 Among today’s advanced industrialized economies, there 
are two general types of systems that are used to regulate economic 
immigration—point-based and employer-driven.
100
 Extracting the best 
components of each of these systems and consolidating them into a 
provisional visa program, as some commentators have suggested, 
provides a path towards formulating workable, simple rules to regulate 
the admission of immigrants who currently fall under the EB-2 and 
EB-3 categories. 
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A. Point-Based Systems 
Across the world’s most developed countries, one of the most 
commonly used systems for regulating economic immigration is the 
point-based system.
101
 This system guides admission determinations 
by awarding points to foreign workers based on the extent to which 
they satisfy a government-set list of qualifications.
102
 As the policy 
goal of point-based systems is to maximize the country’s human 
capital,
103
 the most valued qualifications are typically language skills, 
work experience, education, and age.
104
 Other attributes which are 
usually awarded fewer points include job offer (especially in a high-
demand industry), previous earnings, family ties, and spousal 
education and work experience.
105
 Clarity and flexibility are the 
primary advantages of point-based systems.
106
 The government 
establishes explicit, quantifiable criteria that foreign workers must 
meet to be admitted into the country, resulting in a transparent, easily 
understandable system.
107
 Such clarity and simplicity also facilitates 




Despite these attractive features, point-based systems have the 
drawback of detaching employers from the migrant selection 
process.
109
 Because point systems are established by the government 
and do not necessarily predicate admission on a job offer, they often 
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lead to admission of foreign workers whose qualifications, while 
sufficient to pass the points test, are not demanded by employers in the 
host country.
110
 The potential result is high levels of underemployment 
among admitted foreign workers,
111




B. Employer-Driven Systems 
In contrast to point-based systems, employer-driven systems, such 
as EB-2 and EB-3 immigration, allow employers to directly select 
foreign workers within the (sometimes very strict) confines of 
government regulations.
113
 Employer-driven systems have two main 
advantages over point-based systems. First, employer-driven systems 
closely trace supply and demand by using individualized employer 
preferences to screen prospective migrants.
114
 By allowing employers 
to directly choose workers from the global labor supply who meet their 
particular needs, employer-driven systems optimize the ability of 
immigration to produce economic growth.
115
 Second, employer-driven 
systems ensure a minimum level of integration.
116
 Because foreign 
workers are admitted under this system by virtue of employer 
sponsorship, admission indicates that the worker possesses certain 
qualities that are demonstrably valuable to the labor market.
117
 
Certainly, although the qualities necessary for a single job do not 
guarantee assimilation in the long run,
118
 they show that the foreign 
worker will be admitted with a market-validated threshold capacity to 
contribute to society—something which point-based systems cannot 
guarantee. Moreover, to better ensure long-term benefits under 
employer-driven systems, government regulations can supplement 
                                                 
110
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On the other hand, employer-driven systems can effectively bind 
foreign workers to the specific job through which they gained 
admission.
120
 Because justification for the worker’s admission is 
largely predicated on that specific job, employer-driven systems often 
impose limitations on “portability”—that is, the ability of workers to 
move to a different employer.
121
 These limitations can restrict the 
system’s responsiveness to changing labor demands, and can also 
incentivize employers to exploit migrant labor.
122
 The advantages of 
employer-driven systems can also be diluted by rigorous government 
constraints such as inadequate numerical ceilings or labor certification. 
C. Towards a “Hybrid” System: The Provisional Visa 
Program 
To minimize the disadvantages of each of the foregoing systems, 
commentators have proposed a “hybrid” approach to economic 
immigration that combines the best elements of both.
123
 While the 
hybrid approach may take many forms,
124
 one that has garnered 
increasing attention in recent years is “temporary-to-permanent 
pathways”—sometimes called “provisional visas.”
125
 Such a system 
initially admits employer-selected foreign workers on a temporary 
basis, but allows for adjustment to permanent status through a point-
based system after a probationary period.
126
 In Australia, for example, 
a Skilled Regional Sponsor Visa grants provisional admission based 
on a job offer with the option to apply for permanent status—granted 
through a point system—after two years of residence and one year of 
full-time work in a specified region.
127
 Similarly, in the United 
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Kingdom, foreign workers can obtain renewable three-year temporary 
visas through employer sponsorship with authorization to apply for 
point-based permanent residence five years after entry.
128
 Such 
provisional visa programs account for market forces by allowing initial 
entry based on employer selection, while also reducing the risk of 
worker exploitation by allowing for permanent residence or portability 
after a certain period of time. They ensure a minimum capacity to 
integrate upon initial entry, but apply additional information about the 
migrant—conveyed during the probationary period—to the flexible, 
more multidimensional criteria of a point system to better ensure that 
the country’s long-term interests are served.
129
 
To address the issue of numerical limits on immigration, there has 
been at least one proposal advocating the establishment of a new 
independent federal agency to supplement a provisional visa system.
130
 
According to the proposal, the agency’s mission would be “to propose 
changes that support economic growth while maintaining low 
unemployment and preventing wage depression.”
131
 Pursuant to this 
authorization, it would conduct ongoing analysis of labor market 
conditions and make periodic recommendations to the President, 
policymakers, and other agencies regarding appropriate levels of 
immigration.
132
 The proposal is beneficial because it both substantially 
increases the initial cap, and removes from the treacherous political 
process subsequent decisions to adjust it. 
In offering the foregoing advantages, provisional visa programs do 
not merely offer improvements to the current immigration system, but 
advance the interests of simplicity within the dynamism of the world 
labor market. By largely allowing the market to dictate initial entry 
decisions, and then later utilizing a list of straightforward, 
government-structured priorities to grant or deny permanent status, a 
provisional visa program offers an immigration system with the 
balance of flexibility and constraint that simple rules demand in 
dynamic environments. Specifically, given the fact that “simple” 
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means more than just “unembellished,”
133
 provisional visa rules have 
three particular qualities that help them balance structure and 
flexibility to guide admission determinations within the global 
economy. These qualities are, (1) user-creation, or “endogeneity,” (2) 




Viable, simple rules are best formulated “from within”—that is, by 
the entities that will actually apply them—rather than externally.
135
 
Because these entities directly and actively use the rules in real time, 
they are the most affected by them, and are in the best position to 
evaluate their efficacy.
136
 As such, simple rules generally work best 
when they are created directly by the user. 
Under provisional visa programs, there are essentially two users, 
each at a different point in time in the immigration process. At the 
initial point of entry, the primary user is the employer since temporary 
admission is awarded to the prospective immigrant based chiefly on a 
job offer.
137
 Because trends in the global labor market provide 
employers with the best “rules” regarding hiring decisions, 
conditioning initial entry primarily on employer sponsorship gives 
employers the ability to develop the rules by formulating job 
requirements according to business needs and market trends.
138
 As 
such, the provisional visa program employs endogenous rules at step 
one of the program’s immigration process. 
At step two, where the worker, having passed through the requisite 
probationary period, applies for permanent status, the main user of the 
provisional visa system is the government.
139
As permanent residence 
implicates a scope of concerns that includes, but is ultimately broader 
than, work performance and labor market needs,
140
 a point system 
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structured pursuant to national policy goals accommodates user-
creation of simple rules in deciding whether to admit the worker 
permanently. The government can also utilize additional information 




Immigrant selection under the current EB-2 and EB-3 categories is 
uniquely well-suited to the dual-endogeneity of rule development 
offered by the provisional visa program. Because these categories form 
such a large majority of employment-based immigrants, and are 
predominantly comprised of a garden variety of workers, the 
subjective and qualitative nuances that set these workers apart from 
each other will be important to individual employers for job purposes, 
but less relevant to the country as a whole for purposes of permanent 
residence. This stands in contrast to foreign workers who currently are 
not required to be sponsored by an employer to gain permanent 





 and workers who “serve the national interest” 
in some eminent way.
144
 The rarity, distinction, or otherwise special 
value of these workers’ skills to the country are such that they patently 
convey sufficient and distinctive information about the workers at the 
point of initial entry to warrant their immediate admission as 
permanent residents. In these cases, the extra time and resources 
involved in requiring a probationary period are outweighed by the 
special value the prospective immigrant offers. But where credentials, 
at a general level, are more commonplace such as those that are found 
among EB-2 and EB-3 workers, a probationary period allows the 
government to accumulate more and better information relevant to 
permanent residence that is not conveyed at the initial entry point. At 
the period’s end, the government can then apply its self-generated 
point system to make more well-rounded decisions about which of 
                                                 
141
 See Cox & Posner, supra note 48, at 826-27. 
142
 See INA § 203(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(c) 
(2013). 
143
 See INA § 203(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(c). 
144
 See INA § 203(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i).See also Matter of New 
York State Dep’t of Transportation, 22 I&N 215, 218 n.5 (Comm’r 1998) 
(explaining that a self-petitioning alien under the national interest waiver must 
show that he or she “will serve the national interest to a substantially greater 
degree than do others in the same field”). 
190 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 164 
these workers are suited to become permanent members of American 
society. 
2. Repetitive Capacity 
A second important aspect of the provisional visa program is the 
capacity of its rules to be applied with high repetition.
145
 Because the 
global labor market is fast and fluid and can give rise, often suddenly, 
to high-volume migration inflows, a lack of tools for efficiently and 
consistently making a large number of admission decisions induces 
backlogs, diverts workers to illegal migration routes or other countries 
altogether, and ultimately hurts the national economy. In high-velocity 
environments, rules incapable of being applied with a high level of 
repetition will either be too complex on one end, or too informal on the 
other. Put differently, in dynamic settings, repetitive capacity reflects 
an optimal structure to those rules. 
The provisional visa program instills repetitive capacity in the 
selection process at both the initial entry point and the point of 
application for permanent status. Repetition is inherent in the initial 
entry determination to the extent that employers have efficient hiring 
practices. Driven by market trends and subjective preferences within 
marketplace constraints, employers normally construct a list of job 
requirements that they repetitively apply to numerous applicants to 
hire the ones who meet their needs. Because, under the provisional 
visa program, initial entry decisions trace employer hiring decisions, 
effective mechanisms for managing job applicant streams and 
screening individual candidates simultaneously provide effective rules 
for screening the initial inflow of immigrants. The transparency and 
quantitative nature of the point system also provide rules of high 
repetitive capacity at the time of application for permanent status. 
The repetitive capacity of provisional visa rules can benefit the 
immigration process of foreign workers who currently fall under the 
EB-2 and EB-3 categories by providing a firm, but limited, set of 
criteria to manage a heavy demand for visas. Because the large number 
of conventional foreign workers who seek admission under these 
categories gives rise to high information costs during the selection 
process, an effective mechanism for screening them will be simple and 
technical, and therefore capable of rigorous application. Moreover, 
concerns that such a mechanism may overlook important qualitative 
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attributes of prospective immigrants are mitigated by the endogeneity 
of provisional visa rules. The high cost of detecting valuable personal 
characteristics among numerous, mostly garden-variety EB-2 and EB-
3 workers, can be reduced by allowing employers and the government 
to each craft the rules themselves at the point in the immigration 
process when each is the primary user. Employers can, and often do, 
incorporate subjective preferences into their hiring practices, while the 
government can customize quantifiable point-system criteria according 
to national values and contemporary policy objectives. Therefore, 
vesting rulemaking authority in employers at the initial entry point, 
and in the government at the time of permanent admission, reduces 
information costs at each of these selection points. This can provide 
rules of high repetitive capacity that are also informed by nuanced, 
qualitative considerations. 
3. Adaptability 
Finally, although simple rules must be rigorously applied, they 
must also be amenable to change. Labor markets, national policy, and 
the composition of prospective immigrants all evolve. To adapt to 
these evolutions, immigration law must be capable of modification. To 
be sure, changes to particular provisions and processes within the 
constraints of the current immigration system occur constantly. But 
just as a company’s basic strategy may go stale such that altering the 
rules within it is no longer helpful,
146
 laws may become inadequate to 
the point that change to the laws’ fundamental architecture is 
necessary rather than simply new laws.
147
 If problems are deep, as they 
are with the current immigration system, structural change is necessary 
to facilitate meaningful adaptation in the future.
148
 
The provisional visa program offers this kind of systemic revision 
by instituting a market-tracing selection process at initial entry and a 
straightforward point system at the time of adjustment to permanent 
status. By responding directly to labor market trends, the employer-
driven system that is applied at the point of initial entry is unmatched 
in terms of adaptive capability. By limiting the number of rules to a 
palpable amount, so as to promote ongoing reevaluation and 
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refinement,
149
 a point system offers flexibility at the transition point 
from temporary to permanent status where labor market trends may 
not be as authoritative in the selection process. Moreover, the 
supplemental proposal put forth by some commentators to establish a 
new federal commission that makes periodic recommendations on 
immigration levels introduces a much needed flexibility to historically 
uncompromising numerical limitations.
150
 The need for such flexibility 
is especially urgent in the EB-2 and EB-3 categories in which 
applicants who comprise the core of all employment-based 
immigration must nevertheless wait several years for a permanent 
visa.
151
 By issuing periodic recommendations on the basis of ongoing 
market analysis, the commission regularizes checkpoints for updating 
appropriate immigration levels that are sensitive to marketplace 
needs.
152
 The agility of such an approach could provide an 
improvement over the political embroilments that have historically 
thwarted the ability of numerical ceilings to adapt to marketplace 
realities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For comprehensive immigration reform to work, 
“comprehensiveness” must encompass not only substantive changes, 
but also structural ones. Patchwork reform efforts over the years have 
merely “layered additional burdens on an already inadequate law,”
153
 
further complicating an already disarrayed system. As such, the thrust 
of any durable contemporary reform effort must be systemic 
simplification so that the country can better compete in the global 
economy. The basic three-step business-strategy model that this paper 
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